The United States or the Peace of Others: Europe Facing Its Strategic Decline
The election of Donald Trump and, more broadly, the return of American sovereignism has abruptly reshuffled the cards of transatlantic relations. With a blatant disregard for NATO, contempt for multilateral norms, and a diplomacy of rupture, the United States sent a clear signal to its European allies: they can no longer indefinitely count on Washington’s protection.
For Europeans, it is a painful awakening. For decades, they preferred to rely on American power, delegating their security to an alliance that had become a dependency. Yet the warning signs were there: from the war in Transnistria in 1992 to the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Russia never stopped testing NATO’s red lines.
How could Europe have been so blind? Why did it sacrifice all strategic ambition on the altar of comfort and commerce? And above all, how can it now regain control of its geopolitical destiny? This article attempts to answer these questions.
First, given the vastness of the subject, several factors must be examined. The first is undoubtedly the illusion born from the end of the Cold War. From the 1990s, Europeans believed that the Russian threat had disappeared with the collapse of the USSR. This optimistic reading led to widespread disarmament policies: between 1990 and 2014, European military spending dropped by more than 25% on average, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.[1] The dominant idea was that Russia could become a reliable strategic partner in a pacified world order.
But this view was not shared by Central and Eastern European countries, which had a much more vivid memory of Russian domination. On several occasions, Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania warned their Western partners about the resurgence of Russian imperialism. As early as 2008, at the Bucharest summit, Polish President Lech Kaczyński warned that the aggression against Georgia foreshadowed a future attack on Ukraine. This warning was met with skepticism in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels[2]. In 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, the Baltic presidents demanded an immediate strengthening of NATO in the region. Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves then declared that “the West had refused to listen to those who know Russia from the inside”.[3] Romania, for its part, repeatedly warned about the militarization of the Black Sea. In 2016, President Klaus Iohannis proposed creating a permanent NATO naval fleet in the area, an initiative blocked notably by Germany and other members concerned about “provoking” Moscow.[4]
Meanwhile, the major Western capitals maintained close relations with the Kremlin. Jacques Chirac treated Vladimir Putin as a friend, while Gerhard Schröder, barely out of the German chancellery, joined Gazprom’s board, then that of Rosneft.[5] Nord Stream was launched in 2005, strengthening Europe’s energy dependence on Russia.
This geopolitical choice was made despite a long history of Russian aggression: support for separatists in Transnistria since 1992, two brutal wars in Chechnya (1994–1996 and 1999–2009), the invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and multiple electoral interferences in Ukraine, Serbia, Kazakhstan, and EU countries through disinformation and cyber operations.[6][7][8][9]
Western Europe, blinded by its “soft power” dogma and short-term economic interests, refused to see this threat re-emerge. It did not want to hear those in the East who had already suffered from it.
A second reason is the structural influence of the United States on European security. Since 1945, the United States has shaped Europe’s security architecture through NATO, imposing itself as the continent’s military protector. This leadership was not only a response to the Soviet threat but also a way to guarantee a strategically dependent Europe. From the start of the Cold War, European autonomy initiatives such as the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954 were torpedoed, notably with indirect American support, which preferred Europe under the Atlantic umbrella to an autonomous Europe.[10]
During and after the Cold War, Washington always showed mistrust toward European common defense projects. For example, when France and Germany revived the idea of an autonomous EU military capability after the Kosovo war, the Clinton administration drew a red line: this European force must not duplicate NATO resources nor weaken American command.[11] This posture continued under Bush and Obama, who repeatedly emphasized that European security passed through NATO and therefore the United States.
Under Trump, this paradox intensified: the American president demanded that European countries become “autonomous”… but only by massively increasing their military spending in favor of the American industry. In 2018, Trump threatened to leave NATO if members did not raise military spending to 2% of GDP. Then, in 2025, he imposed a 5% GDP spending target—but only if the funds were used to buy American equipment, notably defense systems like the F-35, Patriot missiles, or HIMARS.[12] A revealing example is the “Ukraine Defense Industrial Base Initiative,” led by Republicans, which foresees Europeans financing Ukraine’s armaments by purchasing… American equipment. This logic has been rejected by several capitals including Paris, Rome, and Prague, despite their commitment to supporting Ukraine, as it hinders the autonomy of the European defense industry.
Thus, the United States historically sought to prevent the emergence of an autonomous European defense, not out of direct hostility but to maintain influence and preserve its military-industrial complex. Europe thus found itself in a strategic vassal position, caught between increasing defense demands and…
Another central reason for Europe’s strategic failure is the lack of collective will to create a European army, hampered by deep mistrust among member states.
The United Kingdom, before Brexit, consistently opposed any European autonomy in defense, fearing it would weaken NATO and its privileged relationship with the United States. It notably blocked the creation of a permanent military headquarters within the EU.
Eastern European countries, meanwhile, fear French-German dominance over a potential common military structure. Deeply Atlanticist, they prefer a direct guarantee from Washington to an uncertain European defense. Poland, for example, despite being at the forefront in supporting Ukraine, continues to oppose strategic autonomy from the United States.
Even between France and Germany, visions diverge: Paris advocates sovereign and active defense, while Berlin, long pacifist, remains hesitant. Industrial disagreements, such as the conflict between Dassault and Airbus around the SCAF project, also slow down concrete cooperation.
And now? Is Europe heading towards autonomy without the United States?
Faced with persistent unpredictability from the United States, and notably a return to offensive isolationism in Washington, Europe is trying to make up for decades of strategic dependence. Since 2024, several governments favoring reinforced European defense have come to power. In France, in the United Kingdom under Keir Starmer, but also in Poland (Donald Tusk), the Czech Republic, Romania, and now Germany under Friedrich Merz, a pragmatic consensus is emerging it is necessary to stop expecting everything from Washington.
One of the most significant gestures was the announcement, at the beginning of 2025, by Paris and London, of a willingness to bring their nuclear capabilities closer together.[13] This is not a full pooling but concrete cooperation: sharing doctrine, coordinating strategic intelligence systems, and networking simulation capacities. This strong signal aims to reassure European partners, notably in Central Europe, about the credibility of a “European umbrella.”
At the same time, several countries actively support the creation of a joint rapid reaction force and an integrated European command. Concrete projects for fleet mutualization, drones, and military training centers are underway. The idea of a single operational HQ in Brussels or Strasbourg is resurfacing.
But these dynamics face two major challenges. On the one hand, the absence of a “European defense industrial hub”: industries remain fragmented, competitive, often duplicated (such as Eurofighter vs Rafale), and dependent on non-European components. This fragmentation slows any strategic buildup. On the other hand, political and geopolitical resistances persist. While Hungary and Slovakia block for ideological reasons, some highly Atlanticist countries like Finland, Latvia, or the Netherlands fear that an autonomous European pillar would undermine NATO and weaken American commitment. They also fear French or German dominance over European military doctrine.
Europe is thus progressing but remains divided between strategic sovereignty and loyalty to the transatlantic architecture. To succeed in becoming a credible autonomous military power, it will be imperative to harmonize defense industries, create a true European hub of innovation and production, and above all build clear common governance capable of transcending national interests. Moreover, it must reassure its most Atlanticist members by maintaining strong ties with NATO while progressively asserting its strategic autonomy. This dual balance is the key for Europe to never again be solely dependent on the United States, but to become a force for peace and stability in its own right.
[1] https://www.sipri.org/publications/2015/sipri-yearbook-2015
[2] https://www.politico.eu/article/in-2008-polands-president-warned-of-russian-aggression-he-was-right/
[3] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/25/ukraine-crimea-nato-estonia-latvia-lithuania
[4] https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/romania-presses-nato-to-set-up-black-sea-naval-fleet/
[5] https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2022-02/russland-gazprom-gerhard-schroeder-aufsichtsrat?utm
[6] https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl?inline=
[7] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0380_FR.html
[8] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/03/russia-europe-far-right-espionage/
[9] https://www.politico.eu/article/voice-of-europe-russia-influence-scandal-election/
[10] https://www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-070-fr.pdf
[11] https://www.cfr.org/report/us-european-defense-relationship
[12] https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/01/trump-nato-5-percent-military-spending/
[13] https://www.ledauphine.com/defense-guerre-conflit/2025/07/09/la-france-et-le-royaume-uni-se-disent-prets-a-coordonner-leur-dissuasion-nucleaire?utm
source featured image: euronews.com
